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Abstract 
 
Relevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the 
gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market 
power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how 
the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory 
Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on 
prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems 
can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the 
gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic 
relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should 
be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations 
in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local 
markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other. 
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1. Introduction 
Market definition is a key element for competition policy enforcement in the gasoline 
market, especially for the retailing segment. Although the use of estimation and simulation 
techniques allows to study market power directly without imposing any market definition, 
defining markets and studying the degree of concentration will remain as an important 
policy tool for long (see Brenkers and Verboven, 2006). Estimation and simulation are still 
depending too much in the assumptions regarding the demand and supply primitives, and 
also on the equilibrium condition chosen. Estimations and simulation of market power will 
be used together with more traditional market definition and concentration analysis for the 
time to come. 
Exists some papers in the economic literature that try to approximate the relevant markets 
in different industries. Argentesi and Ivaldi (2007) in the printed media or Ivaldi and 
Lörincz (2011) to the computer servers industry are some examples. However, for the 
gasoline market we only find papers that analyze the geographic relevant market on the 
wholesale segment. Spiller and Huang (1986) show like the refineries in the northeast of 
United States compete in a different relevant market. These refineries that were more 
isolated can exercise market power. Pinkse et al (2002) analyze the wholesale gasoline 
market in the U.S. too, through a semiparametric estimator. Results show how do not exist 
a global market for all the country, but every refinery compete with their neighbours. So, 
the relevant geographic market is essentially local. Audy and Erutku (2005) apply different 
price test to define the relevant market in the wholesale gasoline market of Canada. 
Authors find a market greater than a city but smaller than all the country. In fact results 
show the existence of more than two markets inside Canada. 
Unlike exists a great number of the empirical evidence about the size of the gasoline 
wholesale market, we have not empirical analysis to measure the size of the relevant 
geographic markets in the retail segment. The economic intuition suggests that markets 
may be local, but we know nothing about the size of these. The aim of this paper is 
measure the size of these markets and proposes economic policy measures to improve the 
level of competition inside. 
To measure the size of the relevant geographic markets in the gasoline retailing we have 
applied the Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices test (SSNIP test). This 
test is being used by the competition authorities to define markets and makes more explicit 
the economic fundamentals of the definition of markets. The US and EU merger guidelines 
are currently using the SSNIP test to define markets. The test measures to what extend a 
monopolist would be interested significantly increase prices (by at least a 5%) permanently 
after getting the ownership of rival firms. If this is so, the products or outlets analyzed are 
in the same relevant market. The aim is to identify the limits within which rivalry has 
beneficial effects for consumers. 
In this paper, we analyse how the application of the SSNIP test performs for defining 
markets using information on prices and distance among retail outlets. The competition 
among petrol stations is a paradigmatic case of competition in local markets. It has the 
common characteristics of competition among retail outlets. There is a growing interest in 
defining local markets using isochrones of equal distance time to study rivalry in retailing 
(Office of Fair Trading 2005, Competition Commission 2003 and Baker 1999). They key 
issue in the study of local competition is to analyse how large isochrones should be to drive 
competitors in. 
We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define 
more precisely relevant geographic markets. Applying the test to petrol stations, we find 
that smaller isochrones drive enough competitors in. Local market power is larger than 
usually thought in competition and retail regulation cases. Results show that the entry of 
new operators within 5-6 minutes belonging to different existing brands can significantly 
reduce the price. In cases involving more than one station of the same brand in the 
relevant market the equilibrium price would be lower if any of the operators change the 
flag and increase the number of competitors. Therefore, remove any entry barrier that limit 
the number of operators as well as policies to facilitate the change of flag can increase the 
level of competition and reduce the price equilibrium. 
After this introductory section, section 2 shows the theoretical relationship between the 
number of participants in the market and price equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data 
used in the paper to apply this methodology to the case of competition among petrol 
stations in roads. Section 4 offers the results of the application of the test to the petrol 
station case. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Number of sellers and price equilibrium 
In this section we illustrate the possible relationship between the number of sellers and the 
price equilibrium with a free entry model. We generalized the model of Campbell and 
Hopenhayn (2005) for a multiseller instead of a single producer. Like in Campbell and 
Hopenhayn (2005) there are a large number of potential entrants who can choose between 
several markets to enter. We index markets with i. Markets are distinguished by the number 
of consumers ( iS ), price factors, demographic and other observable market characteristics 
( iX ) and an error term ( iU ). The error term is independent of iS  and iX  and observed by 
all potential entrants. The variables in iX  and iU  account for differences in cost and 
demand conditions across markets that are exogenous from the perspective of the industry 
under consideration. All parameters describing producers’ costs and consumers’ demand 
curves are functions of iX  and iU . 
We assume that each potential entrant can sell in at least one market. To produce in market 
i, and entrant must incur a fixed cost of entry ( ). Thereafter, it sells its own differentiated 
variety of the insutry’s product using a technology with constant marginal cost, c. After 
entry, active producers simultaneously choose prices. If N sellers populate market i, the 
demand of a producer who sets a price of p while its rivals all charge P is ( , , )iS q p P N . 
Here, (.)q  is the quantity demanded of the producer by a single consumer, which is 
decreasing in p given P. We assume that 
 ( , , ) ( , , ) / , 0q p P t N q p P N t t    (1) 
That is, doubling the number of producers while holding all prices at P cuts each 
producers’ demand by half. This rules out market size effects that are built into the demand 
system. 
A symmetric free-entry equilibrium consists of a price function *( , )iP N S  and a number 
of sellers ( )iN S  that is equal to the number of rival stores and own brand stores 
r oN N N  ; such that: 
i) The price *( , )iP N S  maximizes the profit of any producer in market i if there 
are N producers serving that market and each of the others also chooses this 
price. 
ii) All potential entrants expect to earn exactly zero profit from entering any 
market. Consider first the determination of *( , )iP N S . The condition that 
choosing the price P maximizes each producer’s profits conditional on all 
others’ making the same choice can be written as the familiar inverse demand 
elasticity-markup rule. 
 1( , , , )r oP c p P N N
P
   (2) 
On the right-hand side of (2) ( , , , )r op P N N  is the elasticity of a single producer’s 
residual demand curve. To guarantee that there is a unique solution to (2), we assume that 
it is continuous and increasing in its first two arguments. 
The solution to (2) clearly does not depend on market size, so we henceforth drop iS  from 
its list of arguments and write it as *( , )r oP N N . So that this price is weakly decreasing in 
rN , we also assume that if 'r rN N , then 
 '( , , , ) ( , , , )r o r op P N N p P N N   (3a) 
And that if 'o oN N  
 '( , , , ) ( , , , )r o r op P N N p P N N   (3b) 
These monotonicity assumptions captures the idea that increasing the number of rivals 
(own) sellers weakly increases (decrease) the substitutability of any one producer’s product 
with those of its rivals, and so increases (decrease) that producer’s residual demand 
elasticity. If (3a) and (3b) is a strict inequality, then increasing the number of competitors 
(own brand stores) erodes (increase) each seller’s market power.  
The condition that all entrants earn zero profits following the entry of N sellers is 
 ( *( ), *( ), ) ( *( ) )iS q P N P N N P N c      (4) 
The right hand side of (4) is strictly decreasing in N, so there is a unique number of active 
sellers, ( )iN S  consistent with symmetric free-entry equilibrium. We denote the price those 
sellers charge with ( ) *( ( ))i iP S P N S  
3. Data 
The SSNIP test is very intensive in data requirements. We need to know not only the price 
of a homogeneous enough product sold at different outlets, but also the geographic 
location of each outlet, the distance time among all them, and which outlets are owned by 
each competing firm. 
We are going to use data from all 590 petrol stations open in the roads (not including 
stations in highways neither stations in cities and suburbs) of Catalonia, a region in the 
northeast of Spain with around 7 million of inhabitants that has the size of Belgium or 
Massachussets. Data on regular gasoline prices (unleaded 95 octane) sold at each outlet was 
obtained for the week around 31st July 2005 from the Ministry of Industry webpage. All 
petrol stations were geographically located in a graph, and all time distances by road from 
one petrol station to all other stations were computed (348,100 time distances in total). We 
identify the brand of the petrol station: that is, the name of the major petrol firm that 
owned or served by an exclusivity contract to each petrol station using the information 
provided in the firms’ web pages. All petrol stations that are not branded by any major 
petrol firm are named independents. We also obtained information on traffic density near 
each petrol station and information on the population around each station from the 
Catalan Statistical Office (Idescat). 
Table 1 shows the distribution of petrol stations by brand and the mean and standard 
deviation of prices for each firm. 
Table 1. Number of road petrol stations in roads and average prices by firm 
 
Brand 
Number of petrol 
stations 
Mean Price 
(cents of euro)
Standard 
deviation of 
prices 
Repsol 258 46.962 0.762 
Cepsa 84 46.511 0.908 
Galp 42 46.646 1.183 
Petrocat 35 47.031 0.534 
BP 29 46.747 0.600 
Shell 14 46.313 1.683 
Meroil 14 46.159 1.201 
Tamoil 10 46.936 1.217 
Saras 7 46.295 0.251 
Petromiraller 5 46.962 0.308 
ERG 4 45.962 0.896 
Supermarkets 3 41.249 2.215 
Independents 85 46.324 1.301 
Total 590 46.704 1.054 
Source: Own calculations from the Ministry of Industry and major petrol firms web pages. 
 
Using this data, we have computed for each petrol station a vector that contains the 
number of outlets of rival brands with which they compete given any time distance of 
isochrone going from 1 to 15 minutes. We are assuming that there is not intra-brand 
competition. We allow competition among any independent petrol station, that is, among 
any outlet not owned or served under the flag of the big petrol players. It is not clear to 
what extend stations under an exclusivity contract of the big petrol stations compete with 
each other. According to Contín et al (1998) most petrol stations under contract usually 
earn a fixed percentage on final prices set by the provider. Therefore, they have little or not 
room to alter the prices set in a coordinated fashion for all outlets by the brand owner. 
Table 2 shows whether we find rivals when we define isochrones of 1 to 15 minutes of 
time distance from each petrol station in our database, and the mean number of rivals in 
the isochrones. Table 2 shows the number of markets in which we do not find rival outlets 
within the isochrones, and in those cases the number of markets in which there is more 
than one outlet of the same brand. 
Table 2. Market structure within isochrones 
(distance time in minutes) 
 
Distance 
time 
(minutes) 
 
Number of 
petrol stations 
with rivals in the 
isochrone 
Mean 
number 
of rivals 
Mean 
number 
of own 
brand 
outlets 
Number of 
petrol 
stations 
without 
rivals nor 
own brand 
outlets 
Number of 
petrol 
stations 
without 
rivals but 
with own 
brand outlets
1  37 1.03 0.22 396 157
2  113 1.15 0.96 311 166
3  174 1.28 1.36 236 180
4  255 1.62 1.84 179 156
5  309 1.95 2.43 142 139
6  362 2.24 3.13 114 114
7  416 2.58 3.88 84 90
8  442 3.10 4.70 65 83
9  466 3.79 5.67 53 71
10  475 4.34 6.79 50 65
11  495 4.98 7.92 44 51
12  509 5.64 9.11 32 49
13  521 6.49 10.48 27 42
14  530 7.27 12.02 22 38
15  538 8.08 13.35 17 35
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4. Results 
We have estimated 15 linear regressions to infer the impact of rivalry on equilibrium prices, 
that is the coefficient α1 in the following equation: 
2
0 1 2 3
r o o
i i i i iP N N N          (5) 
where  i=1,2,...,590 petrol stations, riN is the number of rival outlets within the isochrone 
of 1 to 15 minutes, and oiN ,
2o
iN  is the number of petrol stations of the brand of outlet i 
within the isochrones and its square. 
The number of rivals and the number of outlets of the same brand within the isochrone 
might not be exogenous because in equilibrium we expect the number of outlets to depend 
on potential demand (population and traffic) and the number and variety of brands that are 
already in the market. We have estimated the previous equations using not only OLS but 
also instrumental variables techniques using the brand of the nearest rivals, the population 
of the area of each petrol station and the Mean Daily Intensity (MDI) of the traffic in the 
road as instruments. 
The calculation of the population and the IMD allotted to each of the petrol stations 
deserved an explanation. For the population I was calculated using the census regions of 
each service station and its surroundings, the number of people living in radius from 1 to 
15 minutes around the service station. In this way, it was assigned the population residing 
in the market according to its definition. Regarding the traffic has been assigned to each 
service station the nearest traffic measure point of the road.2 
Table 3 shows the IV results. In the specification standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and correlation clustered geographically around roads. 
                                                 
2 The results are not significantly altered if we consider that the traffic can also influence the equilibrium price 
as a demand factor. If there are barriers to entry that deterrence the entry of new operators when the traffic 
increase, traffic can be an explanation of prices and not the number of entrants. 
Table 3. IV estimates 
2
0 1 2 3
r o o
i i i i iP N N N             Observations: 590 
Endogenous regressor: riN ,
o
iN ,
2o
iN . Instruments: population, dummy brand of closest rival, IMD. 
 1 minute 2 minutes 3 minutes 4 minutes 5 minutes 6 minutes 7 minutes 8 minutes
Constant 46.243*** 
(0.396) 
46.040***
(0.437)
46.323***
(0.312)
46.944***
(0.510)
46.216***
(0.943)
45.946***
(0.749)
46.039***
(0.466)
45.915*** 
(0.463) 
N_rival(.) 3.333 
(2.041) 
-4.009
(2.940)
-1.418
(1.059)
0.199
(1.068)
-1.240*
(0.733)
-1.017**
(0.456)
-0.737***
(0.291)
-0.609*** 
(0.243) 
N_own(.) 7.227* 
(3.768) 
3.294
(3.114)
0.256
(1.370)
-1.516
(1.688)
0.733
(1.690)
1.038
(0.979)
0.800
(0.587)
0.767 
(0.506) 
N_own(.)2 -5.952 
(4.341) 
-0.269
(1.225)
0.393
(0.473)
0.446
(0.288)
0.076
(0.245)
-0.027
(0.114)
-0.028
(0.065)
-0.029 
(0.046) 
F(3,172) 3.30** 
(0.0217) 
0.88
(0.4543)
2.27*
(0.0817)
3.34**
(0.0206)
2.64*
(0.0509)
3.20**
(0.0246)
3.94***
(0.0095)
5.26*** 
(0.0017) 
Overidentification 
Hansen J Statistic
4.765 
(0.3122) 
2.733
(0.6035)
7.150
(0.1282)
9.370*
(0.0525)
2.925
(0.5705)
4.052
(0.3991)
3.535
(0.4726)
4.575 
(0.3338) 
 
 9 minutes 10 minutes 11 minutes 12 minutes 13 minutes 14 minutes 15 minutes
Constant 45.671***
(0.464)
45.767***
(0.568)
45.628***
(0.589)
45.465*** 
(0.579) 
45.292***
(0.766)
45.500***
(0.666)
45.456***
(0.676)
N_rival(.) -0.364***
(0.115)
-0.327***
(0.093)
-0.294***
(0.075)
-0.257*** 
(0.074) 
-0.256***
(0.069)
-0.203***
(0.051)
-0.176***
(0.044)
N_own(.) 0.689***
(0.262)
0.553**
(0.237)
0.521***
(0.203)
0.494*** 
(0.156) 
0.505***
(0.192)
0.383***
(0.134)
0.330***
(0.119)
N_own(.)2 -0.031
(0.021)
-0.021
(0.016)
-0.017
(0.012)
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.014*
(0.007)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.007**
(0.003)
F(3,172) 8.18***
(0.0000)
7.59***
(0.0001)
8.42***
(0.0000)
7.64*** 
(0.0001) 
5.6***
(0.0011)
6.42***
(0.0004)
6.18***
(0.0005)
Overidentification 
Hansen J Statistic 
7.999*
(0.0916)
9.210*
(0.0561)
7.438
(0.1145)
6.849 
(0.1441) 
8.120*
(0.0873)
8.390*
(0.0783)
6.930
(0.1396)
Robust Standard Errors within parenthesis (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
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As shown in the table above, almost all estimates are jointly significant at 1% and the 
instruments used are valid, as it indicates the Overindentification Hansen J Statistic3. 
As expected, the effect of rivals on equilibrium prices is negative and statistically significant 
at 1% in most cases. Additionally, as the isochrones get larger the effect of an additional 
competitor is decreasing. This result shows that the effect of having a close competitor is 
larger than the effect of having it far away. 
Additionally, having more outlets of the same brand around has a positive and significant 
impact on equilibrium prices. As the number of outlets increases, larger is the market 
power of a brand. 
Using the estimates of the impact of rivals on equilibrium prices, we have computed the 
test of geographic hypothetical monopolist: we compute the likely mean increase in prices 
that would happen if a rival at different time distance is merged with the hypothetical 
monopolist. To do this once defined our objective function and estimated: 
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0( , , ) ( | , , )
r o o r o oh N N N E p N N N  (6) 
We get our best price prediction if we convert to own brand pumps all the rivals’ gas 
stations: 
2
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
ˆ( 0, , * )r o o r o o oh N N N N N N N     (7) 
In this way we can calculate the price increase that will occur when moving from the 
current balance to the hypothetical market monopolization when we define the market in 
the different forms: 
                                                 
3 For a deeply analysis about instruments see Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2002). 
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2
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1
0
ˆ( 0, , * )ˆ
r o o r o o op h N N N N N N Np
p
        (8) 
Table 4 show the test results of simulates the prices under monopoly. Column 1 shows the 
average price existing in the market and column 2 presents the average price equilibrium if 
one firm monopolize the market. In the column 3 we present the effect of the 
monopolization in terms of percentage. It is clear that the market for which 
monopolization causes a Small (of 5%) but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in 
Prices (SSNIP) is the one defined by an isochrone of 5-6 minutes of distance time. 
 
Table 4. Increase in prices by the hypothetical monopolist with MDI as pricing 
control 
 
 
Minutes 
1 
Average 
price (cents 
of euro) 
2 
Simulate 
average price 
(cents of euro)
1/2 = 3 
Relative price 
effect of 
monopolization 
(%) 
1 46.70414 46.39005 -0.7 
2 46.70414 48.12614 3.0 
3 46.70414 47.96809 2.7 
4 46.70414 47.37012 1.4 
5 46.70414 49.34349 5.7 
6 46.70414 49.16338 5.3 
7  46.70414 48.86589 4.6 
8 46.70414 48.84147 4.6 
9 46.70414 48.10535 3.0 
10 46.70414 48.17785 3.2 
11 46.70414 48.2289 3.3 
12 46.70414 48.17678 3.2 
13 46.70414 48.32711 3.5 
14 46.70414 48.1992 3.2 
15 46.70414 48.2785 3.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Graphs 1 and 2 show how the effect of monopolization is decreasing as the isochrone 
grows larger, and it crosses the 5% threshold in 5-6 minutes. 
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Graph 1. Increase in prices by the hypothetical monopolist in cents of euros (€) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Graph 2. Increase in prices by the hypothetical monopolist in percentage 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
This result has important policy implications both for the analysis of potential mergers and 
to implement measures to promote competition. 
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As regards the analysis of mergers results indicate that the relevant geographic market 
definition, which is essential to observe the evolution of concentration, must take into 
account the local nature of gasoline retailing market. Traditionally the definition of gasoline 
markets has been done ad-hoc and much larger sizes to the results obtained in this 
investigation. A relevant geographic market definition too wide may cause the actual effect 
of the merger is not appreciated. 
As regards the measures to promote competition should affect the market structure within 
5-6 minutes of movement and not across the board. To increase competition are two main 
measures to be implemented. First facilitating the entry of new operators within the 
markets of 5-6 minutes of movement of flags other than those already established. To 
facilitate the entrance you can identify and eliminate potential barriers to entry in the 
market. This entry would have a greater number of rivals which would increase the level of 
competition and reduce the level of prices in the market. Second, measures to facilitate the 
change of flag operators. If a market has more than one gas station with the same flag in 5-
6 minutes of displacement change one flag would increase competition and reduce the 
price level. 
In our empirical application of the 590 petrol stations in the sample, 228 do not have any 
competitor in 6 minutes of travel, allowing them to set prices significantly higher. The entry 
of new petrol stations of different flags, other than those already established, would 
increase competition and reduces the level of equilibrium prices. Among the 228 stations 
with no competitors, 114 stations have some petrol station of the same brand within 6 
minutes of travel. For these 114 petrol stations, change the flag of one of them would 
cause an increased level of competition and reduce the equilibrium price. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Geographic market definitions in merger and entry regulations tends to be too large to take 
into account that competition is only effective if it is close enough. Traditional analysis of 
geographic markets has relied on techniques such as price correlations or chain of 
substitutions that are not able to spot how interaction among outlets is depleted by 
distance. 
We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define 
more precisely relevant geographic markets. In the case of the petrol stations, we show that 
relevant markets are those isochrones of only 5-6 minutes car travel around each petrol 
station. Within each isochrone, without competition it is easy to exert localised market 
power. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition local markets in 
because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other. 
This result may be useful for policymakers. First in merger cases the relevant geographic 
market definition is crucial. An excessively narrow or broad definition of the market can 
lead to not finding significant effects and take wrong decisions. Second, if the aim is to 
introduce measures to increase the level of competition in the markets must take into 
account the local nature of competition between gas stations. In this sense we conclude 
that the elimination of potential entry barriers can facilitate the market entry of new 
operators within 5-6 minutes away, cause an increased level of competition and therefore a 
reduction in the equilibrium prices. Obtaining lower equilibrium prices can not only get 
through the entry of more operators. Measures to help retailers that change brand, can also 
cause an increased level of competition. 
  17
References. 
Argentesi, E., Ivaldi, M., 2007. Market Definition in the Printed Media Industry: Theory, 
Practice and Lessons for Broadcasting. In Paul Seabright and Juergen von Hagen (eds.), 
The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets, Cambridge University Press. 
Audy, E., Erutku, C., 2005. Price test to define markets: an application to wholesale 
gasoline in Canada. Journal of Industry, Competition and trade, 5, 137-154. 
Baker, J., 1999. Econometric Analysis in FTC Vs. Staples. Journal of Public Policy and 
Marketing, 18, 11-21. 
Brenkers, R., Verboven, F., 2006. Market Definition with Differentiated Products- Lessons 
from the Car Market. In Jay Pil Choi (ed.), Recent Developments in Antitrust: Theory and 
Evidence, MIT Press. 
Campbell, J.R., Hopenhayn, H.A., 2005. Market size matters. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 53, 1-25. 
Competition Commission, 2003. Safeway plc and Asda Group Limited: A Report on the 
Mergers in Contemplation, September. 
Contin, I., Correljé, A., Huerta, E., 1998 Estrategias de Fijación de Precios en el Mercado 
Español de la Gasolina (1990-1997). Factores Explicativos. Economía Industrial, 321, 35-
46. 
Ivaldi, M., Lörincz, S., 2011. Implementation Relevant Market Test: Application to 
Computer Servers. Review of Law and Economics, 7(1), 31-73. 
  18
Office of Fair Trading, 2005. Acquisition by Terra For,a Investiments (GP) 2 Ltd of 
United Cinemas International (UK) Limited and Cinema International Corporation (UK) 
Limited. 
Pinkse, J., Slade, M.E., Brett, C., 2002. Spatial price competition: a semiparametric 
approach. Econometrica, 70, 1111-1153. 
Spiller, P.T., Huang, C,F., 1986. On the extent of the market: wholesale gasoline in the 
northeastern United States. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35, 131-145. 
Staiger, D., Stock, J.H., 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. 
Econometrica, 65, 557-586. 
Stock, J.H., Yogo, M., 2002. Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. NBER 
Technical Working Paper Series, No. 284. 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
CREAP2006-01 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
"Economic development and changes in car ownership patterns"  
(Juny 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-02 
Trillas, F. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Duch, N. (IEB) 
"Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of Vehicle Inspection Services"  
(Setembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-03 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Factors explaining local privatization: A meta-regression analysis"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-04 
Fernàndez-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-05 
Artís, M. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA) 
"Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: Empirical evidence using microdata"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-06 
Alcañiz, M. (RISC-IREA); Costa, A.; Guillén, M. (RISC-IREA); Luna, C.; Rovira, C. 
"Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate”  
(Novembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-07 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives: The European Experience”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-08 
Garrido, A. (IEB); Arqué, P. (IEB) 
“The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
CREAP2006-09 
Segarra, A. (GRIT); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
"Productivity growth and competition in spanish manufacturing firms: 
What has happened in recent years?” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-10 
Andonova, V.; Díaz-Serrano, Luis. (CREB) 
"Political institutions and the development of telecommunications” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-11 
Raymond, J.L.(GEAP); Roig, J.L.. (GEAP) 
"Capital humano: un análisis comparativo Catalunya-España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-12 
Rodríguez, M.(CREB); Stoyanova, A. (CREB) 
"Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-13 
Royuela, V. (AQR-IREA); Lambiri, D.; Biagi, B.  
"Economía urbana y calidad de vida. Una revisión del  estado del conocimiento en España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-14 
Camarero, M.; Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.LL. (AQR-IREA).;Tamarit, C.  
"New evidence of the real interest rate parity for OECD countries using panel unit root tests with breaks” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-15 
Karanassou, M.; Sala, H. (GEAP).;Snower , D. J.  
"The macroeconomics of the labor market: Three fundamental views” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2007 
 
 
XREAP2007-01 
Castany, L (AQR-IREA); López-Bazo, E. (AQR-IREA).;Moreno , R. (AQR-IREA)  
"Decomposing differences in total factor productivity across firm size” 
(Març 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-02 
Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP); Roig, J. Ll. (GEAP) 
“Una propuesta de evaluación de las externalidades de capital humano en la empresa" 
(Abril 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-03 
Durán, J. M. (IEB); Esteller, A. (IEB) 
“An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity vs. Tax compliance” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-04 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
“Cross-section data, disequilibrium situations and estimated coefficients: evidence from car ownership 
demand” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-05 
Jofre-Montseny, J. (IEB); Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB) 
“Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-06 
Álvarez-Albelo, C. (CREB); Hernández-Martín, R.  
“Explaining high economic growth in small tourism countries with a dynamic general equilibrium model” 
 (Juliol 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-07 
Duch, N. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Mediavilla, M. 
“Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a quasi-experimental approach” 
 (Juliol 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-08 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT) 
“Innovation sources and productivity: a quantile regression analysis” 
 (Octubre 2007) 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
XREAP2007-09 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Shifting death to their Alternatives: The case of Toll Motorways” 
 (Octubre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-10 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT); Garcia-Quevedo, J. (IEB); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
“Barriers to innovation and public policy in catalonia” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-11 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Foote, J.  
“Comparison of recent toll road concession transactions in the United States and France” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-12 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT);  
“Innovation, R&D spillovers and productivity: the role of knowledge-intensive services” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-13 
Bermúdez Morata, Ll. (RFA-IREA); Guillén Estany, M. (RFA-IREA), Solé Auró, A. (RFA-IREA) 
“Impacto de la inmigración sobre la esperanza de vida en salud y en discapacidad de la población 
española” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
XREAP2007-14 
Calaeys, P. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA) 
“Fiscal sustainability across government tiers” 
 (Desembre 2007) 
 
XREAP2007-15 
Sánchez Hugalbe, A. (IEB) 
“Influencia de la inmigración en la elección escolar” 
 (Desembre 2007) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2008 
 
 
XREAP2008-01 
Durán Weitkamp, C. (GRIT); Martín Bofarull, M. (GRIT) ; Pablo Martí, F. 
“Economic effects of road accessibility in the Pyrenees: User perspective” 
(Gener 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-02 
Díaz-Serrano, L.; Stoyanova, A. P. (CREB) 
“The Causal Relationship between Individual’s Choice Behavior and Self-Reported Satisfaction: the Case 
of Residential Mobility in the EU” 
(Març 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-03 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP) 
“Car ownership and access to jobs in Spain” 
(Abril 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-04 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA) ; Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual 
market hypothesis” 
(Abril 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-05 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP)  
“Job accessibility and employment probability” 
(Maig 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-06 
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. Ll. (AQR-IREA) 
Deconstructing Shocks and Persistence in OECD Real Exchange Rates  
(Juny 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-07 
Sanromá, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Simón, H.  
Portabilidad del capital humano y asimilación de los inmigrantes. Evidencia para España 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-08 
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. Ll. (AQR-IREA) 
Price level convergence, purchasing power parity and multiple structural breaks: An application to US 
cities 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-09 
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA) 
A priori ratemaking using bivariate poisson regression models 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2008-10 
Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB), Hortas Rico, M. (IEB) 
Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish 
municipalities 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-11 
Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT), Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT) 
Immigration and Firm Growth: Evidence from Spanish cities 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-12 
Duch-Brown, N. (IEB), García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Montolio, D. (IEB) 
Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects? 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-13 
Bilotkach, V., Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA), Flores-Fillol, R. 
Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role of distance 
(Desembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-14 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA), Gel, G. (PPRE-IREA) 
Tourism and urban transport: Holding demand pressure under supply constraints 
 (Desembre 2008) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2009 
 
 
XREAP2009-01 
Calonge, S. (CREB); Tejada, O. 
“A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes” 
(Febrer 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-02 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA); Fernández-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Exploring Determinants of Urban Motorcycle Accident Severity: The Case of Barcelona” 
(Març 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-03 
Borrell, J. R. (PPRE-IREA); Fernández-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Assessing excess profits from different entry regulations” 
(Abril 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-04 
Sanromá, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Simon, H.  
“Los salarios de los inmigrantes en el mercado de trabajo español. ¿Importa el origen del capital 
humano?” 
(Abril 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-05 
Jiménez, J. L.; Perdiguero, J. (PPRE-IREA) 
“(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach” 
(Maig 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-06 
Álvarez-Albelo,C. D. (CREB), Manresa, A. (CREB), Pigem-Vigo, M. (CREB) 
“International trade as the sole engine of growth for an economy” 
(Juny 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-07 
Callejón, M. (PPRE-IREA), Ortún V, M. 
“The Black Box of Business Dynamics” 
(Setembre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-08 
Lucena, A. (CREB) 
“The antecedents and innovation consequences of organizational search: empirical evidence for Spain” 
(Octubre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-09 
Domènech Campmajó, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Competition between TV Platforms” 
(Octubre 2009) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2009-10 
Solé-Auró, A. (RFA-IREA),Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Crimmins, E. M. 
“Health care utilization among immigrants and native-born populations in 11 European countries. Results 
from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe” 
(Octubre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-11 
Segarra, A. (GRIT), Teruel, M. (GRIT) 
“Small firms, growth and financial constraints” 
(Octubre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-12 
Matas, A. (GEAP), Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP), Ruiz, A. (GEAP) 
“Traffic forecasts under uncertainty and capacity constraints” 
(Novembre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-13 
Sole-Ollé, A. (IEB) 
“Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?” 
(Novembre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-14 
Del Barrio-Castro, T., García-Quevedo, J. (IEB) 
“The determinants of university patenting: Do incentives matter?” 
(Novembre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-15 
Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA), Artís, M.  (AQR-IREA) 
“Human capital spillovers, productivity and regional convergence in Spain” 
(Novembre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-16 
Álvarez-Albelo, C.  D. (CREB), Hernández-Martín, R. 
“The commons and anti-commons problems in the tourism economy” 
(Desembre 2009) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2010 
 
 
XREAP2010-01 
García-López, M. A. (GEAP) 
“The Accessibility City. When Transport Infrastructure Matters in Urban Spatial Structure” 
(Febrer 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-02 
García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Mas-Verdú, F. (IEB), Polo-Otero, J. (IEB) 
“Which firms want PhDs? The effect of the university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market” 
(Març 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-03 
Pitt, D., Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA) 
“An introduction to parametric and non-parametric models for bivariate positive insurance claim severity 
distributions” 
(Març 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-04 
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Karlis, D. 
“Modelling dependence in a ratemaking procedure with multivariate Poisson regression models” 
(Abril 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-05 
Di Paolo, A. (IEB) 
“Parental education and family characteristics: educational opportunities across cohorts in Italy and 
Spain” 
(Maig 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-06 
Simón, H. (IEB), Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Sanromá, E. (IEB) 
“Movilidad ocupacional de los inmigrantes en una economía de bajas cualificaciones. El caso de España” 
(Juny 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-07 
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB), Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP & IEB) 
“Language knowledge and earnings in Catalonia” 
(Juliol 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-08 
Bolancé, C. (RFA-IREA), Alemany, R. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA) 
“Prediction of the economic cost of individual long-term care in the Spanish population” 
(Setembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-09 
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB) 
“Knowledge of catalan, public/private sector choice and earnings: Evidence from a double sample 
selection model” 
(Setembre 2010) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2010-10 
Coad, A., Segarra, A. (GRIT), Teruel, M. (GRIT) 
“Like milk or wine: Does firm performance improve with age?” 
(Setembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-11 
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB), Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP & IEB), Calero, J. (IEB) 
“Exploring educational mobility in Europe” 
(Octubre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-12 
Borrell, A. (GiM-IREA), Fernández-Villadangos, L. (GiM-IREA) 
“Clustering or scattering: the underlying reason for regulating distance among retail outlets” 
(Desembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-13 
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB) 
“School composition effects in Spain” 
(Desembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-14 
Fageda, X. (GiM-IREA), Flores-Fillol, R. 
“Technology, Business Models and Network Structure in the Airline Industry” 
(Desembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-15 
Albalate, D. (GiM-IREA), Bel, G. (GiM-IREA), Fageda, X. (GiM-IREA) 
“Is it Redistribution or Centralization? On the Determinants of Government Investment in Infrastructure” 
(Desembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-16 
Oppedisano, V., Turati, G. 
“What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time in Europe? Evidence 
from PISA” 
(Desembre 2010) 
 
XREAP2010-17 
Canova, L., Vaglio, A. 
“Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
(Desembre 2010) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
XREAP2011-01 
Fageda, X. (GiM-IREA), Perdiguero, J. (GiM-IREA)  
“An empirical analysis of a merger between a network and low-cost airlines” 
(Maig 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-02 
Moreno-Torres, I. (ACCO, CRES & GiM-IREA)  
“What if there was a stronger pharmaceutical price competition in Spain? When regulation has a similar 
effect to collusion” 
(Maig 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-03 
Miguélez, E. (AQR-IREA); Gómez-Miguélez, I. 
“Singling out individual inventors from patent data” 
(Maig 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-04 
Moreno-Torres, I. (ACCO, CRES & GiM-IREA)  
“Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard” 
(Maig 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-05 
Nieto, S. (AQR-IREA), Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA) 
“¿Afecta la sobreeducación de los padres al rendimiento académico de sus hijos?” 
(Maig 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-06 
Pitt, D., Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Bolancé, C. (RFA-IREA) 
“Estimation of Parametric and Nonparametric Models for Univariate Claim Severity Distributions - an 
approach using R” 
(Juny 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-07 
Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Comas-Herrera, A. 
“How much risk is mitigated by LTC Insurance? A case study of the public system in Spain” 
(Juny 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-08 
Ayuso, M. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Bolancé, C. (RFA-IREA) 
“Loss risk through fraud in car insurance” 
(Juny 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-09 
Duch-Brown, N. (IEB), García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Montolio, D. (IEB) 
“The link between public support and private R&D effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
(Juny 2011) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2011-10 
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Karlis, D.  
“Mixture of bivariate Poisson regression models with an application to insurance” 
(Juliol 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-11 
Varela-Irimia, X-L. (GRIT)  
“Age effects, unobserved characteristics and hedonic price indexes: The Spanish car market in the 1990s” 
(Agost 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-12 
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Ferri, A. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA) 
“A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital requirement 
estimation” 
(Setembre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-13 
Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Pérez-Marín, A. (RFA-IREA), Alcañiz, M. (RFA-IREA) 
“A logistic regression approach to estimating customer profit loss due to lapses in insurance” 
(Octubre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-14 
Jiménez, J. L., Perdiguero, J. (GiM-IREA), García, C. 
“Evaluation of subsidies programs to sell green cars: Impact on prices, quantities and efficiency” 
(Octubre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-15 
Arespa, M. (CREB) 
“A New Open Economy Macroeconomic Model with Endogenous Portfolio Diversification and Firms 
Entry” 
(Octubre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-16 
Matas, A. (GEAP), Raymond, J. L. (GEAP), Roig, J.L. (GEAP) 
“The impact of agglomeration effects and accessibility on wages” 
(Novembre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-17 
Segarra, A. (GRIT) 
“R&D cooperation between Spanish firms and scientific partners: what is the role of tertiary education?” 
(Novembre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-18 
García-Pérez, J. I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J. A.  
“Does grade retention affect achievement? Some evidence from PISA” 
(Novembre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-19 
Arespa, M. (CREB) 
“Macroeconomics of extensive margins: a simple model” 
(Novembre 2011) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2011-20 
García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Pellegrino, G. (IEB), Vivarelli, M. 
“The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
(Desembre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-21 
González-Val, R. (IEB), Olmo, J. 
“Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities: Location, Increasing Returns or Random Growth?” 
(Desembre 2011) 
 
XREAP2011-22 
Gombau, V. (GRIT), Segarra, A. (GRIT) 
“The Innovation and Imitation Dichotomy in Spanish firms: do absorptive capacity and the technological 
frontier matter?” 
(Desembre 2011) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2012 
 
 
XREAP2012-01 
Borrell, J. R. (GiM-IREA), Jiménez, J. L., García, C. 
“Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs” 
(Gener 2012) 
 
XREAP2012-02 
Ferri, A. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA) 
“Solvency capital estimation and risk measures” 
(Gener 2012) 
 
XREAP2012-03 
Ferri, A. (RFA-IREA), Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA) 
“How to use the standard model with own data” 
(Febrer 2012) 
 
XREAP2012-04 
Perdiguero, J. (GiM-IREA), Borrell, J.R. (GiM-IREA) 
“Driving competition in local gasoline markets” 
(Març 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xreap@pcb.ub.es 
